Civil Religion in Turkey: The Unifying and Divisive Potential of Material Symbols
Abstract
Civil religion refers to citizens’ devotion and loyalty to the nation and state. Like other religions, it needs symbols that bond citizens to different notions and experiences whether non-tangible forms (political beliefs, the law, or a constitution) or tangible (flags, images, statues, and spaces). Visual representations of these forms can unite people around common values, goals, and history. This paper aims to widen our understanding of the importance of material objects in developing and sustaining national bonds in Turkey where objects and spaces have long helped to form and maintain Turkish identity, and mobilize and unite people. Of specific importance to this essay, is how material forms of devotion to the Turkish state have been changing since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power in 2002. Turkish democracy has been reshaped, and secular values have been replaced with religious and conservative ones. As Islam has become a basis for civil religion, old material symbols have been challenged, reclaimed, and replaced with icons of the “new Turkey.” These include the Presidential Complex (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Külliyesi), several projects reclaiming Istanbul Taksim Square, and the turning of Hagia Sophia into a functional mosque. I argue that while this new mode aims to transform the nation's consciousness through new narratives, the “spirit of civil religion” still needs material objects and spaces to foster a feeling of belonging to a community and devotion to the state.
Citation: Saçan, Patrycja H. “Civil Religion in Turkey: The Unifying and Divisive Potential of Material Symbols.” The Jugaad Project, 24 Feb. 2021, thejugaadproject.pub/civil-religion-turkey [date of access]
Civil Religion Concepts in Literature
Citizens’ devotion and loyalty to the state have always been the subject of debates in political philosophy, as their love for a country has the power to maintain unity and mobilize personal motivation for the accomplishment of national goals.
For Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, civil religion maintains a special union of citizens by limiting people’s egoism and helping them focus on the common good to shape national identity. Rousseau claims that religion can establish the legitimacy of the republic, strengthen ties with, and loyalty to, the state. For that reason, the loyalty people have to God should be replaced by civil faith, leading to unconditional devotion to the republic and common good [1]. Rousseau’s version of civil religion is one that is designed and controlled by the state to meet its goals. It is a creation of state institutions that secures citizens’ loyalty and maintains political and social order. Opposite to this top-down approach to civil religion is French sociologist Émile Durkheim's bottom-up approach [2] that sees civil religion as a product of society. When people worship an invisible god, analogically they can worship the collective.
In comparison, for French political philosopher Charles-Louis Montesquieu, love for one’s country was virtue [3]. He frames civil religion not on moral principles or Christianity but on a citizens’ love for the law of a country that allows the republic to prosper. Virtue, like religion, is arduous and painful. It implies citizens’ self-sacrifice for the sake of the common good. The republic's survival depends on creating virtue as a transcendental ideal while simultaneously rooting it in the love for equality. Like Rousseau, Montesquieu believes that the common good must become sacred for the people. Love for the republic means that a citizen identifies him- or herself with the whole community.
Further, according to the U.S. authors of The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, diversity and mutual tolerance can unite people and help them feel a sense of connection [4]. Civil religion is the attachment to the republic, the pride of citizenship, and the zeal to cherish the spirit of federalist states. Thus, civil religion in the U.S. is not based on particular religious truths and beliefs, but on public sentiment.
Importantly, “civil religion tends to sacralize certain aspects of civil life by means of public rituals and collective ceremonies” [5]. In this way, beliefs and behaviors acquire a religious dimension when they express the self-identity of collectivity. For example, in the United States, national symbols and rituals transcend religious and social differences to unite people under American citizenship. Civil religion serves as an instrument of national religious self-understanding. It mobilizes citizens for the attainment of national goals. In other words, the republic can survive if its customs and citizens are continuously reproduced.
In many countries, the state uses civil religion as a political tool to advance national policies and programs. Theological symbols, language, and rituals describe, conceive or legitimize politics and political processes.
Civil religion can be a political tool because it can manifest itself in ideology and culture—it can express association with a specific group. It can also be a construct serving a political leader that is imposed on citizens. In other words, it can be at the service of the state, as a coercive political device. Consequently, it can fuel social conflicts and build divisions. While certain groups of values, symbols, and rituals are important for one group, they might not have the same importance for another group. Different groups can produce their symbols and ceremonies [6].
Finally, civil religion is not exclusive to democracies. Civil religion can serve well the leaders of undemocratic states. Sacrifice for the state can be observed in fascist, nazist, and communist states, where people gave their lives while fighting under the ruler's order.
Material Symbols in Civil Religion
Material objects play an essential role in any religion. Tangible and touchable things are physical representations/embodiments of sacredness and divinity that bond people belonging to the same religious community. Material forms can carry metaphysical significance—they can become symbols of beliefs and faiths and express people’s aspirations. In civil religion, material objects develop citizens’ attachment to political values analogically, give shape to their beliefs and help comprehend the world in transcendental as well as immanent form. Humans take actions because of the meaning material forms have for them. National symbols communicate ideas, goals, and beliefs and foster thoughts and behaviors aligned with them. Through those forms, people share ways of behavior and outlook within a community to construct strategies and actions.
Figure 1: Turkish Flag. Source: photo by Tarik Haiga on Unsplash.
The impact on people’s behavior lies in the psychological effects of national symbols that encourage identification and promote group unity. Consequently, political leaders tend to use national symbols for their campaigns and their goals. For that reason, states encourage or regulate the display of national symbols.
Why are material forms and rituals associated with those symbols so important for a nation? The reason is that a nation is an imagined community [7], where members cannot know every fellow-member. Although people do not know each other, there is a deep fraternal relationship that can make people sacrifice to protect their country. People tend to seek things in common, such as memories, practices, places, signs, and objects. Moreover, creating an identity and culture requires living the myths and symbols, including images, labels, or texts in everyday life at all levels of society.
Material objects such as flags can not only mobilize citizens but they can also reproduce ‘nation’. In daily life, flags and other reminders of nationhood allows the state to constantly reproduce the nation. A flag, a piece of colored fabric, associated with the nation is commonly used for rituals and acts of worship. Easily reproduced and distributed, the flag, for example, in the US, symbolizes unity and can be seen outside the post office, schools, houses, and many other places.
A flag is a small but important reminder of a citizen's nationality that can significantly impact political thought and behavior, including voting. Exposure to a flag increases the feeling of unity and allegiance to a specific ideology. National symbols might be particularly useful during uncertain times, such as the struggle for freedom. Also, in times of war, a flag is an object of territorialization, placed in the conquered land. For instance, Argentina's soldiers placing a flag on Falkland Island.
Figure 2: Turkish flag on Ankara University Campus. Source: photo by Ankara University on Unsplash.
The sense of community motivates people to sacrifice for the nation. The graves of soldiers who died protecting the nation are imbued with ghostly national thoughts and fantasies because of their cultural significance.
Nevertheless, material objects, important for nurturing allegiance to the political community, are subject to change. As political ideas and leaders change, political imaginaries go through a transformation. Material objects are needed to foster new roles and behaviors. For example, material culture played an important role in the formation of the French state [8]. Reproduction of nations depends on group remembering and forgetting imagination, and commonplace recurrence. Through material forms, collective memory is preserved.
Material Objects and the Turkish Republic
The foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the beginning of a new era and a new state. Atatürk decided on a strategy of erasing the memory of the Ottoman past. Thus, the republic was based on forgetting, and narrative, myths, and symbols had to be constructed anew.
The secularisation of a new state in the 1920s and 1930s involved a series of reforms initiated by the government, including new ways of dressing, writing, talking, and behaving. The aggressive secularizing (laikleşmelaikleştirme) reforms aimed at establishing a new society and defining “homo Kemalicus”, a person guided by positivism and forced amnesia. Laicism (laiklik) became a modernizing ideology of the state, which pushed Islamism to the periphery. These top-down reforms narrated any challenge to the new order as Islamic fanaticism. [9].
“De-Ottomanization” and the creation of the Turkish Republic were connected to politicized approaches to rebuilding the cities. The use of space symbols aimed to connect inhabitants with secularism and to strengthen state power. To achieve it, the political elites were transforming “Ottoman cities”, in particular, Ankara and Istanbul, into “Kemalist cities”. Thus, the early republic’s architectural discourse was focused around “monumentality, national symbolism, and power”.
The transformation from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey developed an architectural lexicon in the service of a new Turkish nation. Material objects and spaces became powerful tools fostering an image of a new nation and devotion to the republic. Enriching city spaces with new monuments and statues was a part of forming a nation under the tutelage of Atatürk. To achieve it, the government excluded the Ottoman statues as parts of urban spaces. Breaking with the past aligned with Atatürk’s vision of rebuilding the relationship between the state and the people. To foster a new secular order, Ottoman symbols had to be gone. Consequently, Ankara, Istanbul, and many cities around the country went through complete nationalization.
As in the Ottoman-era, the city center was built around a mosque; it was moved away from Islam-marked places in the Early Republic. In Ankara, the city center was recommemorated by the Republic Square in 1927 (named Ulus Square later on), with an iconic Monument of the Republic, a statue of Atatürk on a horse—a symbol of victory in the 1923 War of Independence. Further, in Istanbul, away from Sultan Ahmet Square, Taksim Square became the city center and the symbol of a new secular country. The square became a location for the Republic Monument (Cumhuriyet Anıtı), inaugurated in 1928.
These two examples of raising monuments are representations of the relationship between power and architecture. A building, a monument, or a statue are signs of power and represent the perspectives of those who create them. Their visual aspect is determined by political and cultural context. Those objects not only foster legitimacy of political power, but they also constitute political reality because their creators constructed them on a specific political discourse.
Turkey is not an isolated case of forgetting the past and rebuilding the urban spaces. Throughout the twentieth century, a visual language of iconoclasm was developed as the removal of some parts of heritage. Italy and Germany implemented various programs after the Second World War of demolition and elimination of the most symbolic public memorials and buildings that reminded people of the old regimes. Those places in urban spaces that were not demolished were left to fall into ruin or modified for re-use in a new state as a part of “pragmatic forgetting” [10].
In Italy, the process of “mutilation” of old material symbols involved removing the blades from the axes on buildings and monuments, as they were symbols of Fascism. In this way, the new political power neutralized and disempowered material objects conveying the old system's power. It was a symbolic action of political subjugation and defeat of the old regime.
Remaking and creating new material objects and spaces was related to the fact that Atatürk and his political elite inherited a society where the notion of Turkish identity did not exist. The identity, a new social structure as well as national symbols, had to be created from scratch. Atatürk wanted to build a homogenous country with one language and unique history, the opposite of the Ottoman Empire. New ethnics called “the Turks” needed an identity and a new system of values. Thus, myths and memory needed to be created, and the government used ethnosymbolism to ignite devotion and loyalty to the newly established republic.
The creation of national identity focused around the figure of Atatürk as a father of a young Turkish nation and The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). The cult of Atatürk started when the leader was still alive and became deeply rooted in collective consciousness facilitating civil religion among Turkish citizens. His figure fostered legitimation of the republican system as a new social reality and became a symbol to call upon at different times when the republic was challenged or threatened.
Production of numerous statues, busts, and portraits became a part of the deification of Atatürk. Monuments representing Atatürk were rising around Turkey, among others: the statue of Atatürk on a horse in Samsun (1931), the standing statue of Atatürk in Konya (1926), the Trust monument in Ankara displaying Atatürk surrounded by youths, and the leader’s quote: “Turk, be proud, work hard, and trust”, or Atatürk monument in Izmir (1932) with the allegorical representation of the War of Independence. Those, and hundreds of similar material objects, represented the nation's father watching from every corner. They became the urban symbols of the newly formed Turkish Republic and the beginning of Turkish identity.
Figure 3. Atatürk monuments in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Samsun. (Source: Ahmet Piriştina City Archives and Museum City (Ahmet Piriştina Kent Arşivi ve Müzesi).
Figure 4. Atatürk monument in İzmir, Turkey, dedicated to the Turkish War of Independence. (Photo by: Gözde Yılmaz).
However, the biggest project began after Atatürk’s death in 1938. The construction of Atatürk’s mausoleum in Ankara, Anitkabir, was initiated not only to pay respect to the eternal leader (“ebedi sef”) but also to create a space that would be a symbol of secular religion, a nationalist equivalent to a space of religious ritual, prayer, and spirituality [11]. The idea of Atatürk’s immortality is equivalent to the continued survival of the Turkish nation. Kemalism was marked by a mystical dimension, and the secular elite did its best to make it a dominant element of the Turkish nation's collective imaginary.
Figure 5: 10 November 1953, the transfer of Atatürk's body from Dolmabahçe Palace to Anıtkabir. (Source: Ahmet Piriştina City Archives and Museum City (Ahmet Piriştina Kent Arşivi ve Müzesi).
Figure 6: 10 November 1953, the transfer of Atatürk's body from Dolmabahçe Palace to Anıtkabir. (Source: Ahmet Piriştina City Archives and Museum City (Ahmet Piriştina Kent Arşivi ve Müzesi).
Anıtkabir was becoming a new center of the capital and the country, where official ceremonies would be held. This national monument's design referred to pre-Islamic, Greek-Anatolian traditions, another example of intentional separation from Ottoman-style.
Anıtkabir was set on Rasattepe (Observation Hill), a strategic location in Ankara that could be seen from all parts of the city. Commenced on October 9, 1944, by laying the foundation stone, the construction took nine years and was divided into four stages, with the last one completed on September 1, 1953. It consists of four main parts: the Road of Lions, the Ceremonial Plaza, the Hall of Honor (location of Atatürk's tomb), and the Peace Park that surrounds the temple. Also, ten towers situated in a symmetrical arrangement symbolizing the ideas and principles of the Turkish Republic: Independence Tower, Female statue group, Freedom Tower, Male statue group, Mehmetçik Tower, Victory Tower, Peace Tower, 23 April Tower, Tower of Reforms, and Misak-ı Millî (National Pact) Tower [12].
Figure 7: 10 November 1953, the transfer of Atatürk's body from Dolmabahçe Palace to Anıtkabir. (Source: Ahmet Piriştina City Archives and Museum City (Ahmet Piriştina Kent Arşivi ve Müzesi).
The most significant ceremony conducted at Anitkabir occurs on November 10, the anniversary date of Atatürk’s death. On this day at 9.05 am, a one-minute silence takes place throughout Turkey. This commemoration is something that anyone in Turkey (including foreigners) is obliged to follow.
Anıtkabir combines the institutionalization of Turkish identity, memory, and nationalism. This shrine of Atatürk became a place of approximately 8 mln visitors every year. “Sculptures, reliefs, floor paving, and even ceiling patterns are combined in a narrative spatial experience that illustrates, explains and reinforces the imagined history of the Turks, their struggle for independence, and the founding of the Republic of Turkey after the fall of the Ottoman Empire” [13]. The process of building as well as maintaining the monument contributes to shaping Turkish national collective memory. Generations have been responsible for the maintenance and reproduction of the importance of the place. Performed rituals and commemorative ceremonies in this place are part of elaborating on the love for the republic. It is about reminding the citizens about the values of the Republic that they should follow in their daily lives.
Importantly enough, the idea of constructing Anıtkabir came from the secular elite as a top-down strategy of developing devotion to the Turkish republic. However, maintenance of the place can be seen as a bottom-up initiative, showing respect to the Atatürk’s memory.
Atatürk’s deity penetrates all spheres of the lives of Turkish citizens. During national holidays, Turkey is covered with images of the immortal leader. The state buildings, including offices, schools, hospitals, are decorated with huge posters of Atatürk and Turkish flags. Television channels display an image of Atatürk in the corner.
Figure 8: Atatürk Bust (Atatürk Maskı) in Izmir. Source: photo by Mert Kahveci on Unsplash.
Further, the founding father is also present in every public and private school in the form of different size monuments. Children sing the national anthem in front of Atatürk every Monday and Friday. Special Atatürk Corners were established in schools where his photographs, posters, and books about him are displayed.
Figure 9. Atatürk and Izmir Exhibition in the garden of Ahmet Piriştina City Archives and Museum City (Ahmet Piriştina Kent Arşivi ve Müzesi). (Photo by: Gözde Yılmaz).
Figure 10. Atatürk and Izmir Exhibition in the garden of Ahmet Piriştina City Archives and Museum City (Ahmet Piriştina Kent Arşivi ve Müzesi). (Photo by: Gözde Yılmaz).
Figure 11. Atatürk and Izmir Exhibition in the garden of Ahmet Piriştina City Archives and Museum City (Ahmet Piriştina Kent Arşivi ve Müzesi). (Photo by: Gözde Yılmaz).
Moreover, the visual representations of Atatürk are located in the public offices, assembly halls, and cafeterias. Often those images are accompanied by quotes from Atatürk, resulting in visual as well as educational representation in urban spaces. Some images are personalized for a location. To illustrate, in a local municipality’s marriage office, one can find an image of Atatürk dancing at the wedding or an image of Atatürk on a swing at the playground.
Figure 12. A calendar published by Izmir Metropolitan Municipality (İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi) in a public office. (Photo by: Gözde Yılmaz).
Since the 1990s, images of Ataturk have become commodities that Turkish consumers buy for display at their homes and private businesses [14]. Atatürk images present in grocery shops, barbershops, coffee shops become deeply ingrained into people’s subconscious. People go to sleep and wake up seeing the leader’s portrait and other objects.
The Turkish flag also carries the meaning and memory of Independence and was adopted by a newly founded state as a symbol of the Republic. The red color represents the blood of Turkish fighters who lost their lives against the occupying forces and became martyrs. In the middle of the flag, a crescent and a star are placed. According to the popular narrative, Turkish soldiers’ blood was spread all over and crescent, and star were miraculously reflected on the blood pool.
Contestation of Visual Representations of Atatürk
The visual representations of Atatürk and their meaning were not free from contestation and contra-interpretations. The sacred figure of Atatürk was protected by the law from 1951 criminalizing insult to his memory: Law 5816: “The Law Concerning Crimes Committed Against Atatürk'” (Aleyhine Islenen Suçlar Hakklnda Kanun) and Turkish Penal Code’s Article 301 criminalizing Degrading Turkish Nation, State of Turkish Republic, the Organs and Institutions of the State, including Atatürk.
Law 5816 states that: “Anyone who publicly insults or defames the memory of Atatürk shall be sentenced to one up to three years imprisonment. Anyone who destroys, damages, destructs or pollutes statues, busts, and monuments representing Atatürk or Atatürk’s grave is sentenced to one up to five years imprisonment” [15]. Law 5816 is an example of ‘memory law’ that the state has used many times against persons who challenge or interpret the events or persons of the past [16].
In March 1998, poet Yilmaz Odabasi was sentenced to eighteen months in prison by the Ankara State Security Court for insulting Atatürk. In October 2005, Murat Vural from Ankara was convicted under Law 5816, after he had poured paint over several statues of Atatürk, located in public spaces, including two schoolyards. The man was sentenced to 22 years and six months of imprisonment. However, the appeal court reduced the sentence to 13 years of imprisonment. At the same time, the trial court ruled on several restrictions on Vural, including a ban from voting, while being imprisoned. Vural claimed he carried out his actions to express his dissatisfaction with the Kemalist ideology. In June 2013, he was conditionally released from prison.
Another case was about a YouTube video published in March 2017 that included defaming images and statements of Atatürk and scenes of destroying the Turkish flag. The Istanbul 1st Criminal Court of Peace issued an order to block access to YouTube at the domain level.
In 2006, at a conference organized by the youth branches of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), professor Atilla Yayla referred to Atatürk as “this man” (“bu adam”) and questioned whether Kemalism had contributed to the country’s progress. In addition, he stated that soon Turks would be challenged why there are so many statues of Atatürk in Turkey. The court ruled on a sentence of one year and three months of prison, which was changed to two years of supervision later on.
On November 10, 2018, Emine Şahin, a 21-year-old university student from Edirne, was arrested for “insulting Atatürk.” During a ceremony commemorating the eightieth anniversary of Atatürk’s death, she shouted, “Atatürk is not divine, Allah has laws. Atatürk brought the West’s laws.” She explained that it was against Islam to commemorate Atatürk as a divine figure [17].
It should be noted that in many cases, the Turkish state used Law 5616 and Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code against “the enemies” of the state, in particular Islamic groups.
Islam has continuously challenged Atatürk’s memory in Turkey. Islam and Kemalism offer different grounds for national identity, social cohesion, and political unity. Establishment of a secular republic and pushing Islam to the periphery created a deep tension between the state and the Islamic groups. The latter was challenging the secular regime for decades.
In particular, in the 1990s, the public memory of Atatürk was the subject of conflict between secular and Islamic groups. Both groups agreed that the foundation of the Republic was a turning point in history, but they disagreed on Atatürk’s intent. Islamists referred to the religious nature of the foundation of the Turkish Republic. They were using images of Atatürk praying with religious leaders and his headscarved wife [18].
On October 29, 1998, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic, various Turkish newspapers such as Sabah, Milliyet, or Cumuriyet displayed images of Atatürk on their front pages. Some of them portrayed the founding father in a modern and secular context. However, Islamist daily Akit published a picture of Atatürk never seen before by the public. It was an image from the declaration of the Republic with Atatürk accompanied by, among others, a religious leader with a white turban and the title, “It started like this” [19].
It was Islamism that contributed to the dissolution of Kemalist hegemony and reconceptualizing democracy for its own goals. The demand for democracy intended to put Kemalist hegemony to an end. Islamists started bringing a concept of modern national identity. Modernization and national identity became subjects of reinvention and reinterpretations of the republican system by Islamist groups. Since the 1980s, those groups started to dissolve the Kemalist imaginary.
Erdoğan and New Material National Symbols
National identity is not static. It evolves and is subjected to change. It accommodates different themes and values at different periods and under different governments. Consequently, a changing national narrative affects myths, symbols, and spaces.
The material symbols, which for decades played an important role for civil religion in Turkey, have been reclaimed and reinvented ever since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with the AKP came to power in 2002. It can be observed that Erdoğan has been changing Turkey as no one before, except Atatürk himself.
The Republic marked by Kemalism and secular values, has been transformed and reconstructed. Erdoğan and Islamic political forces redefine what it means to be Turkish by incorporating Islam as a core element of national identity. “The very meaning of the ideal life that the state seeks to promulgate has changed any other in the Republic’s history. Previously, the Turkish state employed its laik vision of an ideal life by way of its institutions. However, the AKP now uses the state and its institutions to redefine the ideal life according to its own agenda” [20].
Here comes the clash that has always been present: Kemalist versus Islamism, ideologies with different visions of state, nation, and society. Secular Turkey with an ambition to become a western-like society, and Islamist Turkey with religious nationalism and status among Muslim countries.
Consequently, those in power want to secure privileged positions, and material symbols are the representation of those actions. Turkey has become a hegemonic-authoritarian state structure with Sunni Islam as a focal element of Turkish identity and the fundamental for new civil religion.
In the past, Atatürk and the secular elites redefined culture and nation through acts of memory. Now, Erdoğan and AKP reshape state institutions to build an Islamist political structure. Just like Atatürk shaped Turkey according to a secular vision, Erdoğan shapes a new Turkey with Islamist domestic and international policies by returning to pre-Kemalist times. With a counter-revolution, Islam is brought to the center of politics, and Erdoğan’ becomes a new father of the country. It is Islam that now mobilizes a considerable part of the population and develops allegiance to the country.
Figure 13. Turkish flag and images of Atatürk and Erdoğan on the City Hall in Izmir (İzmir Hükûmet Konağı). (Photo by: Gözde Yılmaz).
While secular Turkey was based on forgetting, current Islamic Turkey is about the revival of the forgotten past. The Ottoman era that was forgotten by Kemalism, is glorified by the state and its supporters. Ottoman motifs are introduced in all spheres of life, recreated in national education, national holidays, media, and foreign policy. The current practices of “banal Ottomanism” by Erdoğan a symbolic component of the re-identification of Turkish society, facilitating the reintroduction of Islamic-Ottomanist traditions into everyday routines [21].
As in the past, the landscape has a symbolic dimension and role in creating a collective memory of today’s Turkey. A significant project of creating new space is the Presidential Complex (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Külliyesi) also called Ak Saray (White Palace) on the outskirts of Ankara in Beştepe. The palace was built in the Ottoman style and includes a mosque, library, hospital, and many more. A 1,000-room palace costing $350m, this structure marked a historic break with the Cankaya presidential palace in the center of Ankara.
Erdoğan’s vision for this massive urban symbol in Ankara is to represent the restructuring of Turkey and undermining Kemalism. He uses architecture to redesign an Ankara aligned with the party ideology and values. It envisions a new political realm and shows new dominant power in Turkey.
Erdoğan declared the palace the symbol of a “New Turkey”: “From now on, the owner of the Republic is the nation itself, and its symbol is the Presidential Külliye. From now on, nobody will be able to implement their ambition for tutelage by coming up in the name of the Republic, in the name of defending the Republic, and with claims that the Republic has been jeopardized. This change is not only symbolic. It has a very strong infrastructure and background” [22].
In Istanbul, several projects targeted to reclaim Taksim Square. Historically, Taksim Square was a symbolic place of secularism and then a space for protest and social movements. Finally, it became a space for expressions of mass politics banned by Erdoğan’s government.
In 2013, the government decided to reconstruct a former Ottoman Artillery Barracks located in the present-day Taksim Gezi Park. Shortly after, Istanbul witnessed public demonstrations against the plans to destroy one of the most iconic green spaces in Istanbul and rebuild it as a space of neo-Ottoman nostalgia [23]. The state attempted to erase it to create a place in a specific historical image. As a consequence of civil unrest, Gezi Park was not destroyed. However, left for decay and ruin, it has not been maintained by the state.
Further, Taksim Square has been remade by a large new mosque in 2019, which changed the Square's topography: a house of religious worship dominating the monuments secular republic changes the design and the unique character of the space. It represents a glorification of the Ottoman past and proclaims Islam as a city Islamic faith.
Erdoğan decided to demolish a landmark opera house in Taksim Square that symbolized Atatürk’s progressive vision of the country. Consequently, Erdoğan replaces Atatürk’s cultural legacy with his own by building a new opera house on the ashes of the old one.
Finally, Erdoğan restored the historic Hagia Sophia (Ayasofya Müzesi) as a functioning mosque in 2020. Once a Byzantine-era cathedral and then a museum established by Atatürk in 1935, the museum was a symbol of Turkey’s modern secular state for more than 80 years. This decision shows that secularism has been reshuffled to second place while Islam prevails. Reclaiming Hagia Sophia for Islam was not only a move to satisfy the religious and conservative electoral base, but to define what current Turkey is.
Conclusion
This study shows that civil religion needs tangible symbols to develop and maintain citizens’ devotion to the state and foster a feeling of belonging. National symbols conflate ideas, goals, and beliefs as well as facilitate thoughts and behaviors aligned with them. Associated material objects, ceremonies and rituals need to be continuously reproduced because the national narrative cannot do without its material and embodied manifestations.
It is important to note that transformation of material symbols follows governmental or regime change. Those who gain power create new icons, myths, and narratives that serve their political goals. Thus, history is as much about forgetting as remembering.
The Republic of Turkey was about forgetting the Ottoman past and replacing old symbols with new ones that promoted secular value and fostered the sense of belonging to the nation of Atatürk. To achieve it, urban spaces were marked by the founding fathers’ monuments and statues, which became signs of power and representation of the secular elite’s vision of a suitable political and social structure.
As Atatürk inherited a population that did not have a concept of Turkish identity, material objects became tools igniting love for the newly established country. They also played an educational role teaching people the values and principles to follow in public and private lives. Just as a religion needs sacred places for people to reflect on their beliefs and perform rituals, the secular elite built Atatürk’s mausoleum, Anitkabir as a space for a secular religion. Performed rituals and commemorative ceremonies in the shrine are part of elaborating and reflecting on the love for the republic.
The material symbol’s inherent value is however tenuous and does not protect it from being contested, rejected and replaced by new political leaders and their supporters. These developments show the fragility of nationalistic icon building and consequently the need to protect icons with legal and other measures. With Erdoğan and the AKP winning elections in 2002, Turkey and Turkish identity started to change. A civil religion based on ‘love’ for secular values has been replaced with civil religion based on Islamic values.
This political and social transformation has been followed by reclaiming and changing secular material icons. The forgotten Ottoman past finds its representation in new urban architecture, such as the Presidential Complex or the mosque in Taksim Square. Islam’s dominance in political and social spheres transforms the Hagia Sophia museum into a functional mosque. These changes foster a sense of national unity among the Sunni Muslim segment of the population and new icons conflate new values, beliefs, and narratives.
To sum up, Turkey is divided into secular and Islamic segments that share different values and seek to dominate public spaces through relevant symbols. The evolving material national symbols in Turkey thus show the unifying as well as divisive potential of material forms.
References
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[15]. “Turkish Law 5816,” Mela Project http://melaproject.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/Ataturk%20Aleyhine%20Islenen%20Suclar%20Hakkinda%20Kanun.pdf
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[18]. Esra Özyürek, ed., The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007), 114-115.
[19]. Nur Betül Çelik, The Constitution and Dissolution of the Kemalist Imaginary, in David Howarth, Aletta Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis, eds., Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000) 200-201.
[20]. Tanıl Bora, “Nationalist Discourses in Turkey,” The South Atlantic Quarterly, vol.102, no. 2/3 (2003): 433-451, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/43701.
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